Odd Interpretations of Science

How do the realist and instrumentalist interpretations of science differ? Consider one or two arguments for each position, and decide which is more plausible?.

Introduction:

The philosophy of science investigates the foundations and implications of scientific inquiry, giving rise to pivotal debates about the nature and purpose of scientific theories. At the heart of discourse are two divergent viewpoints: scientific realism and instrumentalism. Scientific realism posits that the success of science is best explained by theories that accurately describe an objective reality. In contrast, instrumentalism contends that theories are merely tools for prediction, with no necessity to reflect true aspects of the world. This essay aims to delineate the arguments supporting both positions, with an emphasis on the ‘no miracles argument’ for realism and the pragmatic utility argument for instrumentalism, however, emphasises why realism is a more plausible position.

Philosophical Underpinnings:

Realism is based on the conviction that a reality exists outside of human consciousness, a stance suggesting that our scientific theories, when effective, accurately mirror this reality (Okasha, 2002). On the other hand, instrumentalism, which supports ontological agnosticism, posits that the significance of scientific theories is not found in their factualness but in their usefulness as instruments for prediction (Godfrey-Smith 2003). However, the instrumentalist viewpoint is enriched by the recognition that observation, the cornerstone of empirical science, is influenced by the theories we hold, a notion substantiated by the role of language and the problem of incommensurability in scientific discourse. This implies that the way we report and interpret scientific findings is deeply intertwined with our conceptual frameworks, challenging the possibility of a theory-neutral language in science.

Instrumentalism encourages a methodological focus on theories that are simple, effective, and conducive to application, even if they offer no ontological insights. These foundational differences are significant because they influence how scientists conceptualize their work and how we understand and value scientific knowledge. While realism drives the pursuit of an ever-deeper understanding of the universe, instrumentalism pragmatically steers science towards the development of tools that enhance our ability to navigate and manipulate the world, all while acknowledging that our contact with the world is inevitably shaped by our beliefs. The philosophical underpinnings of each viewpoint thus shapes not only the scientific endeavour but also our broader worldviews.

Scientific Realism:

Scientific realism posits that the predictive success and explanatory power of scientific theories are more than accidental coincidences; they reflect an accurate, approximate, representation of an objective reality. Advocates for this stance bring forward the ‘no miracles argument,’ which asserts that the efficacy of scientific theories in predicting phenomena would be a miraculous coincidence if those theories did not correspond to how the world truly is (Putnam, 1975). This line of reasoning draws strength from the historical progression of science, where theories evolve, each refining and extending our grasp of the universe’s workings. This reality, scientific realism argues, can be progressively disclosed through our scientific endeavours, where theories like Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics accurately describe phenomena at different scales and under varying conditions.

A challenge to the scientific realist position comes from the contention that observation, essential to empirical validation, is invariably shaped by the observer’s beliefs and theoretical commitments. Such a claim contends that our observational reports are imbued with theories, which could erode the objectivity realism embraces. The interpretation of observational data, therefore, may not be as straightforward as realism would suggest, due to the complicated influence of the observer’s conceptual framework. Nonetheless, scientific realism can offer a compelling counterargument by examining the practical applications of scientific theories. The success of these theories in practical technology serves to reinforce the realist claim that despite the theory-laden nature of observation, our scientific theories are still capable of reflecting true aspects of the physical world.

Instrumentalism:

Instrumentalism diverges distinctly from realism, arguing that the significance of scientific theories is their role as predictive devices, not as means of conveying actual truths. This viewpoint, notably backed by Van Fraassen in 1980, proposes that the purpose of science should not be to discover an outright truth about the universe, but to create empirically sufficient theories; in other words, theories that satisfactorily explain what we can observe, without necessarily purporting to describe the unobservable aspects of existence. Instrumentalism holds that our observations are inherently interpreted through the filter of our current theories and beliefs, so the pursuit of an observation untainted by theory is not just impossible but also not beneficial. The idea promotes that aiming for a neutral language of theory is not a viable aim, as our existing theoretical structures are necessary to shape significant scientific questions. Without these frameworks, the ability to pose questions, design experiments, and interpret data would be significantly hindered.

The instrumentalist view is further supported by the argument that our descriptions of the world are necessarily steeped in the concepts of our current theories, as we cannot describe or represent the world without them. In this view, theories are indispensable in guiding scientific exploration and in shaping the formulation of questions that lead to scientific advancement. As our understanding evolves, so do the theoretical frameworks that underpin this understanding, demonstrating the dynamic interplay between theory and observation. Instrumentalism acknowledges the flexibility required in scientific practice. It allows for a mutable approach to scientific theories, treating them as flexible tools that must adapt to new observations and empirical data.

Historical Cases:

The progression of scientific thought, as seen in the historical development of scientific theories, provides a deep understanding into the discussion between realism and instrumentalism. Consider the shift from Newtonian mechanics to Einstein’s theory of relativity as a prime instance. Einstein’s framework did not just introduce new predictive instruments; it also radically transformed our comprehension of spacetime, proposing that it bends in response to mass and energy. From the viewpoint of realism, this advancement may be regarded as a more accurate reflection of the realities of gravitational forces, correcting the inadequacies of Newtonian mechanics, particularly in the intense environments near large stars or black holes. However, from an instrumentalist viewpoint, such paradigmatic shifts in science underscore the cyclical nature that Kuhn described. Kuhn observed that science operates within a cycle of ‘normal science,’ punctuated by periods of ‘crisis’ when existing frameworks are unable to account for anomalies, eventually leading to ‘scientific revolutions’.

These revolutions usher in new paradigms that are not just different sets of tools but are also better suited to solving the puzzles and dealing with the anomalies that the old paradigms could not. This pattern supports the instrumentalist view that scientific theories are tools that evolve over time, honed by their utility in explaining and predicting phenomena. For instance, the shift from the phlogiston theory to the oxygen theory in chemistry reflects such a cycle. Realists may interpret this as a step closer to the truth about combustion, while instrumentalists might argue that the oxygen theory’s rise was due to its superior utility in explaining observable phenomena. The oxygen theory, more useful and empirically adequate, effectively replaced the outdated phlogiston theory without necessarily claiming a closer ontological truth. These historical episodes highlight the resilience of the realist interpretation, but they also demonstrate the flexibility and adaptability of the instrumentalist approach, which assesses theories based on their immediate empirical success and practical utility. The cyclical pattern of normal science, crisis, and revolution, as detailed by Kuhn, reflects a dynamic process that aligns with the instrumentalist position, suggesting that scientific advancement is not a straightforward march towards truth but a complex dance of adaptation and change.

Evaluation:

In assessing scientific realism versus instrumentalism, the influence of Kuhn’s theories is vital. Instrumentalism values the utility of scientific theories for their predictive capabilities, an essential aspect since science engages with and forecasts natural phenomena. This practicality invites critiques regarding the objectivity realism aspires to, a concern highlighted in discussions on Kuhn’s work. Kuhn’s model of science, punctuated by paradigm shifts, seems to imply relativism and a departure from rationalism, potentially undermining the quest for objective truths. However, Kuhn doesn’t dismiss rationality or objectivity; rather, he presents a nuanced picture of scientific activity as paradigm-influenced, yet still rooted in rational pursuit. Scientific realism, striving for a profound comprehension of reality, provides a more encompassing narrative of the scientific endeavour than instrumentalism. It integrates the empirical achievements of science and the historic evolution of theories with the rational essence of scientific inquiry, even within the bounds of shifting paradigms. Scientific realism is closely aligned with the intrinsic aspirations of science: to explain reality, not merely to predict events. It regards the enduring success of theories as evidence of their truth, pointing to a gradual refinement toward truth.

Theoretical progress, with new theories enhancing and clarifying their predecessors, affirms this view, suggesting an ongoing journey toward an authentic understanding of reality. Furthermore, realism showcases rigorous scientific exploration, proposing that theories can unearth fundamental truths about the universe, thereby prompting scientists to delve into the ‘why’ behind the ‘what’, the core of scientific exploration. This quest for truth surpasses the practicality of instrumentalism, encompassing a drive to decipher the underlying principles that regulate phenomena. Realism also provides a convincing narrative for novel predictions confirmed by later observations, asserting that such theories have revealed hidden dimensions of reality.

Instrumentalism, by contrast, would regard these as merely expedient without conceding any profound truth. Additionally, realism enhances the concept of scientific explanation, enabling a deeper grasp of causality and the structures of existence, an aspect instrumentalism overlooks, as it focuses solely on the observable. In essence, while instrumentalism appreciates the practicality of theories as predictive tools, realism offers a fuller, more philosophically satisfying understanding of the scientific process. Emphasizing the explanatory and integrative nature of scientific theories as they strive to represent and explain the underlying fabric of the world.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the discourse between scientific realism and instrumentalism engages with the core of scientific inquiry, each offering a unique perspective on the interpretation and purpose of scientific theories. Instrumentalism presents a practical view, treating theories as indispensable tools for prediction and problem-solving, while acknowledging the influence of paradigms and the flexibility required in scientific interpretation, as reflected in Kuhn’s analysis of scientific progress. Realism, on the other hand, seeks to explain empirical successes by positing that theories, when successful, likely reveal true aspects of an objective reality. Ultimately, while instrumentalism pragmatically captures the methodological aspect of science, it is the philosophical commitment of realism to a deeper understanding of the universe that provides a comprehensive framework for interpreting scientific practice. Scientific realism, therefore, emerges as a more plausible account, resonating with both the historical trajectory of science and our intuitive pursuit of knowledge, not as a mere means to an end but as a continual quest for truth about our universe.

References:

1. Cartwright, N (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford University Press.
2. Godrey-Smith, P (2003) Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Press, Ch.12
3. Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
4. Okasha, S. (2002). Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Putnam, H (1975) What is Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76
6. Van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press. Woodward, J (1992) Realism about laws. Erkenntnis 36: 181-218